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Abstract. In this paper, we analyse competing double auction market-
places that vie for traders and need to set appropriate fees to make a
proﬁt. Speciﬁcally, we show how competing marketplaces should set their
fees by analysing the equilibrium behaviour of two competing market-
places. In doing so, we focus on two diﬀerent types of market fees: regis-
tration fees charged to traders when they enter the marketplace, and proﬁt
fees charged to traders when they make transactions. In more detail, given
the market fees, we ﬁrst derive equations to calculate the marketplaces’
expected proﬁts. Then we analyse the equilibrium charging behaviour of
marketplaces in two diﬀerent cases: where competing marketplaces can
only charge the same type of fees and where competing marketplaces can
charge diﬀerent types of fees. This analysis provides insights which can
be used to guide the charging behaviour of competing marketplaces. We
also analyse whether two marketplaces can co-exist in equilibrium. We
ﬁnd that, when both marketplaces are limited to charging the same type
of fees, traders will eventually converge to one marketplace. However,
when diﬀerent types of fees are allowed, traders may converge to diﬀer-
ent marketplaces (i.e. multiple marketplaces can co-exist).
Key words: Competing Marketplaces, Nash Equilibrium, Evolutionary
Game Theory, Double Auctions
1 Introduction
Financial exchanges, in which securities, futures, stocks and commodities can be
traded, are becoming ever more prevalent. Now, many of these adopt the dou-
ble auction market mechanism which is a particular type of two-sided market
with multiple buyers (one side) and multiple sellers (the other side). Speciﬁ-
cally, in such a mechanism, traders can submit oﬀers at any time in a speciﬁed
trading round, and can be matched by the marketplace at a speciﬁed time.
The advantages of this mechanism are that traders can enter the marketplace
at any time and they can trade multiple homogeneous or heterogeneous items
in one place without travelling around several marketplaces. In addition, this
mechanism provides high allocative eﬃciency [3]. These beneﬁts have led many
electronic marketplaces to also use this format. For example, Google owns Dou-2 B. Shi, E. H. Gerding, P. Vytelingum and N. R. Jennings
bleClick Ad Exchange1, which is a real-time double auction marketplace enabling
large online ad publishers, on one side, and ad networks and agencies, on the
other side, to buy and sell advertising space. However, because of the globalised
economy, these marketplaces do not exist in isolation. Thus they compete against
each other to attract traders and make proﬁts by charging fees to traders. For
example, stock exchanges compete to attract companies to list their stocks in
their marketplaces and make proﬁts by charging listing fees to these companies,
and Google competes against other ad exchanges, such as Microsoft’s AdECN
and Yahoo!’s Right Media. However, there exists a conﬂict between attracting
traders and making proﬁts for the competing marketplace, since when the fees
are increased, traders will leave the marketplace and eventually cause a decrease
of proﬁts for this marketplace. Against this background, in this paper, we anal-
yse the equilibrium behaviour of competing marketplaces in terms of charging
fees to traders, which can provide insights to guide how competing marketplaces
should set their fees.
In more detail, there are two key issues in the research of competing market-
places. The ﬁrst is how traders should choose which marketplace to go to. Then,
given the traders’ market selection strategies, the second issue is how competing
marketplaces should set their fees to maximise proﬁts while at the same time
maintaining market share at a good level in order to ensure proﬁts in the long
term. Now we have analysed the ﬁrst issue in our previous work [1], so here we
focus on how competing marketplaces set their fees.
Related to our work, a number of theoretical models have been proposed
to analyse two-sided competing marketplaces (e.g. [2,5,6,8]). However, these
works do not consider auction mechanisms to match traders and set transac-
tion prices. Instead, they assume that traders only select marketplaces based on
the number of other traders in the marketplace. In doing so, they assume that
all traders are homogeneous (i.e. have the same preferences), and the market-
place has complete information about the preferences (also called the types) of
traders. In real-world auction marketplaces, however, traders are usually het-
erogeneous and they are likely to have privately known preferences. Moreover,
transaction prices are usually set according to the marketplace’s pricing policy,
which is aﬀected by current demand and supply. Also related to our work is
the Market Design Competition (CAT), an annual competition and part of the
Trading Agent Competition (TAC) which was introduced to promote research
in the area of competing double auctions [4]. However, the work related to CAT
is still largely empirical in nature. To tackle these limitations, in our previous
work [1], we proposed a novel game-theoretic framework to analyse the competi-
tion between double auction marketplaces from a theoretical perspective, which
assumes that traders are heterogeneous with diﬀerent types2 and the type of
each speciﬁc trader is not known to the other traders and marketplaces. Based
on this framework, we analysed the traders’ Nash equilibrium (NEQ) market
1 http://www.doubleclick.com/
2 The types of buyers and sellers represent the buyers’ limit prices and the sellers’ cost prices
respectively. The limit price is the highest price that the buyer is willing to buy the item for, and
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selection strategies. Moreover, using evolutionary game theory (EGT) [10], we
analysed how traders dynamically change their market selection strategies and
determined which strategies traders eventually converge to.
In this paper, we extend this work by analysing how double auction mar-
ketplaces set their fees to make proﬁts in a multiple competing marketplaces
environment. In this environment, if the marketplace charges higher fees than
its opponents, then it may make more proﬁts in the short-term. However, even-
tually traders will choose to leave this marketplace and choose to migrate to
the cheaper marketplace. This will therefore result in a decrease of proﬁts. Thus
the competing marketplace should charge appropriate fees to make proﬁt and
maintain market share given its opponents’ fees. In this paper, we will analyse
this pattern by considering the equilibrium charging behaviour between market-
places. In reality, two types of fees are usually charged to traders. One is the
ex-ante fee charged to traders before they make transactions. The other is the
ex-post fee charged conditional on traders making a transaction [5]. Speciﬁcally,
in our analysis, we consider the registration fee charged to traders when they
enter the marketplace, and the proﬁt fee charged to traders when they make
transactions as a typical example of ex-ante and ex-post fees respectively. Fur-
thermore, we analyse under what conditions several competing double auction
marketplaces can co-exist when traders converge to their equilibrium market se-
lection strategies. That is, we are interested in analysing whether competition
can be maintained, or whether the marketplaces collapse to a monopoly setting
where all traders move to one marketplace. This is important since competition
drives eﬃciency and oﬀers more and better choices to traders. In previous work,
we found when competing marketplaces are only allowed to charge the proﬁt
fees, traders eventually converge to one marketplace. In [2] which considers the
competition of two-sided marketplaces, researchers claim that when two com-
peting marketplaces diﬀerentiate themselves from each other, they may co-exist.
In this paper, we will analyse the co-existing issue in the context of competing
double auction marketplaces.
In particular, the contributions of this paper are as follows. First, we pro-
vide a novel approach to estimate marketplaces’ expected proﬁts given the equi-
librium strategies of the traders and the fees charged by other marketplaces.
Second, based on the estimated expected proﬁts of marketplaces, we are the
ﬁrst to analyse the equilibrium charging behaviour of competing double auction
marketplaces. Finally, we show that in our framework, when diﬀerent types of
fees are allowed, traders may converge to diﬀerent marketplaces, i.e. competing
marketplaces can co-exist.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we brieﬂy describe the
general framework from [1] for analysing competing double auction marketplaces.
In Section 3, we provide an approach to estimate marketplaces’ expected proﬁts.
Then in Section 4, we analyse the equilibrium for two settings: when competing
marketplaces charge the same type of fees, and with diﬀerent type of fees. We
also investigate under what under conditions competing marketplaces co-exist.
Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 5.4 B. Shi, E. H. Gerding, P. Vytelingum and N. R. Jennings
2 General Framework
In this section, we brieﬂy introduce the framework developed in [1]. We start by
introducing basic notations of our framework. Then we introduce the market-
places and their policies. Finally, we describe the market selection strategies in
detail and give a general equation for a trader’s expected utility.
2.1 Preliminaries
We assume that there are a set of buyers, B = {1,2,...B}, and a set of sellers,
S = {1,2,...S}. Each buyer and seller has a type, which is denoted as θb and θs
respectively. We assume that types of all buyers are independently drawn from
the same cumulative distribution function Fb, with support [l,¯ l], and the types
of all sellers are independently drawn from the cumulative distribution function
Fs, with support [c,¯ c]. The distributions Fb and Fs are assumed to be common
knowledge and diﬀerentiable. The probability density functions are fb and fs
respectively. In our framework, the type of each speciﬁc trader is not known to
the other traders and marketplaces, and only the type distribution functions are
public. In addition, we assume that there is a set of competing marketplaces
M = {1,2,...M}, that oﬀer places for trade and provide a matching service
between the buyers and sellers.
2.2 Marketplaces and Fees
Since we consider marketplaces to be commercial enterprises that seek to make
a proﬁt, we assume they charge fees for their service as match makers. The fee
structure of a marketplace m is deﬁned, as Pm = hpb
m,ps
m,qb
m,qs
mi, pb
m,ps
m ≥ 0
and qb
m,qs
m ∈ [0,1], where pb
m, ps
m are ﬁxed ﬂat fees charged to buyers and sellers
respectively (in this paper, as an example, we consider registration fees charged
to traders when they enter the marketplace as a typical kind of ﬁxed ﬂat fee),
and qb
m, qs
m are percentage fees charged on proﬁts made by buyers and sellers
respectively (in the following, we refer to such fees as proﬁt fees). Then the fees
of all competing marketplaces constitute the fee system P = hP1,P2,...PMi. In
addition, we use P−m to represent fees of all marketplaces except for marketplace
m. Then P can be rewritten as P = hPm,P−mi. Furthermore, the transaction
price of a successful transaction in marketplace m is determined by a parameter
km ∈ [0,1], i.e. a discriminatory k-pricing policy, which sets the transaction
price of a matched buyer and seller at the point determined by km in the interval
between their oﬀers. The pricing parameters of all marketplaces constitute the
pricing system K = hk1,k2,...,kMi.
2.3 Trader Market Selection
We assume that traders can only choose a single marketplace at a time (called
single-homing), but they can freely migrate to a diﬀerent marketplace in the
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publish their fees and pricing parameters. Second, based on the observed fees
and pricing parameters, each trader selects a marketplace according to its market
selection strategy. Third, traders submit their oﬀers according to their bidding
strategies. Finally, after all traders have submitted their oﬀers, the marketplace
matches buyers and sellers according to its matching policy and then executes
transactions. For simplicity, we assume that only one unit of commodity can
be traded by each trader in a giving trading round. Intuitively, we can see that
the traders’ choice of marketplaces is important since this signiﬁcantly aﬀects
the marketplaces’ positions in the competition. Given this, in the following, we
present the traders’ market selection strategies in more detail.
We consider a mixed market selection strategy, where each marketplace is
selected with some probability. A pure strategy can be regarded as a degen-
erate case of a mixed strategy, where the particular pure strategy is selected
with probability 1 and every other strategy with probability 0. Now, a mixed
market selection strategy of buyer i is deﬁned as ωb
i : [l,¯ l] × M → [0,1], which
means the probability that buyer i with type θb chooses the marketplace m is
ωb
i(θb,m), where
P
m∈M ωb
i(θb,m) ≤ 1. Here, 1 −
P
m∈M ωb
i(θb,m) is the prob-
ability that buyer i with type θb chooses no marketplace. The complete mixed
market selection strategy of buyer i with type θb is given by:
δb
i(θb) = hωb
i(θb,1),ωb
i(θb,2),...ωb
i(θb,M)i, δb
i(θb) ∈ ∆,
where ∆ is the set of all possible mixed strategies of a trader:
∆ =
(
hx1,...,xMi ∈ [0,1]M :
M X
m=1
xm ≤ 1
)
Similarly, we use ωs
j : [c,¯ c]×M → [0,1] to deﬁne the probability of selecting
a marketplace of seller j, and write the complete strategy as:
δs
j(θs) = hωs
j(θs,1),ωs
j(θs,2),...ωs
j(θs,M)i, δs
j(θs) ∈ ∆
.
Now we use δb = hδb
1(·),δb
2(·),...δb
B(·)i to denote the strategy proﬁle of buyers,
and δs = hδs
1(·),δs
2(·),...δs
S(·)i that of the sellers. Given a buyers’ strategy proﬁle
δb and a sellers’ strategy proﬁle δs, the expected utility of a buyer i with type
θb is deﬁned by:
˜ Ub
i (P,K,δb,δs,θb) =
M X
m=1
ωb
i(θb,m) × ˜ Ub
i,m(P,K,δb,δs,θb) (1)
where ˜ Ub
i,m(P,K,δb,δs,θb) is buyer i’s expected utility if it chooses to trade in
the marketplace m, which depends on the speciﬁc matching policy adopted by
marketplace m. The expected utility of the sellers is deﬁned analogously.6 B. Shi, E. H. Gerding, P. Vytelingum and N. R. Jennings
3 Marketplace’s Expected Proﬁt
In the above we have speciﬁed a general framework for analysing competing
double auction marketplaces. Before we can analyse the equilibrium charging
behaviour of marketplaces, we need to know marketplaces’ expected proﬁts given
their fees and given the behaviour of the traders. In this section, we will describe
how to calculate marketplaces’ expected proﬁts.
In order to calculate the marketplaces’ expected proﬁts, we need to know
which bidding strategy traders will use to submit their oﬀers and which match-
ing policy marketplaces will use to match buyers and sellers to make transactions.
Speciﬁcally, traders’ bidding strategy and marketplaces’ matching policy used in
this work are speciﬁed as follows. As we did in [1], we assume that traders use a
truthtelling bidding strategy, which means they will submit their types as their
oﬀers during the trading process. For the matching policy, we consider equilib-
rium matching since this aims to maximise traders’ proﬁts and thus maximises
the allocative eﬃciency for the marketplace. In detail, this policy will match the
buyer with v-th highest limit price with the seller with v-th lowest cost price if
the seller’s cost price is not greater than the buyer’s limit price. Furthermore,
we assume that traders with the same type will employ the same market selec-
tion strategy. Thus in the following, we omit the trader’s index i, j when it is
intuitively clear.
Now in order to get insight from this complicated game with more traders
and more types, we use the same simplifying assumptions made in [1]. We only
consider the competition between two marketplaces, i.e. M = 2. In order to
allow for tractable results, we restrict our analysis to discrete trader types. In
particular, we assume that there are two types of buyers and two types of sellers:
rich and poor, which are denoted by tb
2 and tb
1 respectively for buyers, and ts
1 and
ts
2 for sellers. A rich buyer is deﬁned as having a higher limit price than a poor
buyer, i.e. tb
2 > tb
1, and a rich seller is deﬁned as having a lower cost price than a
poor seller, i.e. ts
1 < ts
2. Trader types are independently drawn from the discrete
uniform distribution (i.e. both types are equally likely). In addition, since we
focus on how to set marketplace fees, we keep the pricing parameter km = 0.5
(m = 1,2). Then marketplaces can only aﬀect traders’ market selections by
changing fees.
Now we are ready to derive the equations to calculate marketplaces’ expected
proﬁts given the fee system P. Firstly, we calculate marketplaces’ expected proﬁt
given traders’ market selection strategies: ωb(tb
1,m), ωb(tb
2,m), ωs(ts
1,m) and
ωs(ts
2,m). In order to do this, we calculate the probability that there are exactly
τb
1 poor buyers and τb
2 rich buyers choosing the marketplace m:
%
b
m(τ
b
1,τ
b
2) =
 
B
τb
1,τb
2,B − τb
1 − τb
2
!
∗
 
ω
b(t
b
1,m)
2
!τb
1
∗
 
ω
b(t
b
2,m)
2
!τb
2
∗
 
1−
ω
b(t
b
1,m)
2
−
ω
b(t
b
2,m)
2
!(B−τb
1−τb
2)
(2)
where

B
τb
1,τb
2,B−τb
1−τb
2

is the multinomial coeﬃcient,
ω
b(t
b
1,m)
2 is the probability
that a buyer is poor and chooses marketplace m. Similarly, we get the probabilitySetting Fees in Competing Double Auction Marketplaces 7
that there are exactly τs
1 rich sellers and τs
2 poor sellers in the marketplace m:
%
s
m(τ
s
1,τ
s
2) =
 
S
τs
1,τs
2,S − τs
1 − τs
2
!
∗
 
ω
s(t
s
1,m)
2
!τs
1
∗
 
ω
s(t
s
2,m)
2
!τs
2
∗
 
1−
ω
s(t
s
1,m)
2
−
ω
s(t
s
2,m)
2
!(S−τs
1 −τs
2 )
(3)
Furthermore, marketplace m’s expected proﬁt when there are exactly τb
1 poor
buyers, τb
2 rich buyers, τs
1 rich sellers and τs
2 poor sellers in this marketplace is
calculated by:
˜ Um(P,τb
1,τb
2,τs
1,τs
2) = (τb
1 + τb
2) ∗ pb
m + (τs
1 + τs
2) ∗ ps
m + Λb ∗ qb
m + Λs ∗ qs
m (4)
where Λb, Λs are the buyers and sellers’ share of the trading surplus respectively
when τb
1 poor buyers, τb
2 rich buyers, τs
1 rich sellers and τs
2 poor sellers are
matched according to the equilibrium matching policy3. At this moment, we
can get the marketplace’s expected proﬁt given the traders’ market selection
strategies: ωb(tb
1,m), ωb(tb
2,m), ωs(ts
1,m) and ωs(ts
2,m):
˜ Um
“
P,ω
b(t
b
1,m),ω
b(t
b
2,m),ω
s(t
s
1,m),ω
s(t
s
2,m)
”
=
PB
τb
1=0
PB−τb
1
τb
2=0
PS
τs
1=0
PS−τs
1
τs
2=0 %
b
m(τ
b
1,τ
b
2) ∗ %
s
m(τ
s
1,τ
s
2) ∗ ˜ Um(P,τ
b
1,τ
b
2,τ
s
1,τ
s
2) (5)
Now given a fee system P, we calculate the marketplaces’ expected proﬁts at
the point where all traders use equilibrium market selection strategies. As we
discussed in [1], there can exist multiple Nash equilibria of market selection
strategies. In such cases, the marketplace’s expected proﬁt depends on which
NEQ strategies traders will choose and the probability of choosing such NEQ
strategies. In [1], given a fee system, we have used EGT to analyse how traders
choose NEQ strategies. Similarly, in this paper, we use EGT to ﬁnd which NEQ
strategies traders will choose and with what probability.
In more detail, in EGT, players gradually adjust their strategies over time
in response to the repeated observations of their opponents’ strategies. In par-
ticular, the replicator dynamics equation is often used to specify the dynamic
adjustment of the probability of which pure strategy should be played. Then
in our work, the 4-population replicator equations (rich buyers, poor buyers,
rich sellers and poor sellers) showing the dynamic changes of traders’ selection
strategies with respect to time t are given by:
˙ ω
b(t
b
1,1) =
dω
b(t
b
1,1)
dt
=
“
˜ U
b
1(P,K,δ
b,δ
s,t
b
1) − ˜ U
b(P,K,δ
b,δ
s,t
b
1)
”
∗ ω
b(t
b
1,1) (6)
˙ ω
b(t
b
2,1) =
dω
b(t
b
2,1)
dt
=
“
˜ U
b
1(P,K,δ
b,δ
s,t
b
2) − ˜ U
b(P,K,δ
b,δ
s,t
b
2)
”
∗ ω
b(t
b
2,1) (7)
˙ ω
s(t
s
1,1) =
dω
s(t
s
1,1)
dt
=
“
˜ U
s
1(P,K,δ
b,δ
s,t
s
1) − ˜ U
s(P,K,δ
b,δ
s,t
s
1)
”
∗ ω
s(t
s
1,1) (8)
˙ ω
s(t
s
2,1) =
dω
s(t
s
2,1)
dt
=
“
˜ U
s
1(P,K,δ
b,δ
s,t
s
2) − ˜ U
s(P,K,δ
b,δ
s,t
s
2)
”
∗ ω
s(t
s
2,1) (9)
3 This can be easily calculated. For example, when there are 2 rich buyers, 3 poor buyers, 3 rich
sellers and 2 poor buyers in the marketplace m, Λ
b =
“
max(t
b
2 − t
s
1,0) ∗ 2 + max(t
b
1 − t
s
1,0) +
max(t
b
1−t
s
2,0)∗2
”
∗km and Λ
s =
“
max(t
b
2−t
s
1,0)∗2+max(t
b
1−t
s
1,0)+max(t
b
1−t
s
2,0)∗2
”
∗(1−km).8 B. Shi, E. H. Gerding, P. Vytelingum and N. R. Jennings
As an example, ˙ ωb(tb
1,1) describes how the poor buyer with type tb
1 changes
its probability of choosing marketplace 1. Here, ˜ Ub
1(P,K,δb,δs,tb
1) is the poor
buyer’s expected utility when choosing marketplace 1 given other traders’ strate-
gies, and ˜ Ub(P,K,δb,δs,tb
1) is the poor buyer’s overall expected utility. Given
that traders use the truthtelling bidding strategy and marketplaces use the equi-
librium matching policy, these equations have been derived in [1]. In order to get
the dynamics of the strategies, we need to calculate trajectories, which indicate
how the mixed strategies evolve. In more detail, initially, a mixed strategy is cho-
sen as a starting point. For convenience, we use
“
ω
b(t
b
2,1),ω
b(t
b
1,1),ω
s(t
s
1,1),ω
s(t
s
2,1)
”
to represent this starting point. The dynamics are then calculated according to
the above replicator equations. According to the dynamic changes of traders’
strategies, their current mixed strategy can be calculated. Such calculations are
repeated until ˙ ωb(·,1) and ˙ ωs(·,1) become zero, at which point the equilibrium
is reached. The replicator dynamics show the trajectories and how they converge
to an equilibrium. When considering traders evolving from all possible starting
points, we get several regions. The region where all trajectories converge to a
particular equilibrium is called the basin of attraction of this equilibrium. The
basin is very useful since its size indicates the probability of traders converging
to that equilibrium, which is necessary for calculating marketplaces’ expected
proﬁts.
However, since probabilities are continuous from 0 to 1, there are inﬁnitely
many mixed strategies available to each type of trader. Thus the set of possi-
ble starting points is also inﬁnite, which results in the diﬃculty of accurately
calculating the sizes of basins. In this work, we have to discretize the starting
points to approximate the size of basin of attraction to each NEQ. By so doing,
we know the probability of traders converging to each equilibrium. For exam-
ple, in this paper we calculate the size of basin of attraction by discretizing the
mixed strategy of each type from 0.01 to 0.99 with step size 0.049, which gives
214 = 194481 diﬀerent starting points. Note that if we use even more points, we
can estimate the probability of traders’ convergence to each equilibrium more
accurately.
Now that we know, given a fee system P, what NEQ strategies traders will
choose and with what probabilities. We calculate the expected proﬁt for a mar-
ketplace. Speciﬁcally, given that there are X possible NEQs market selection
strategies, we use hx1,x2,...,xXi to represent the probabilities of traders con-
verging to these NEQs. Then the marketplace m’s expected proﬁt in the fee
system P is:
˜ Um(P) =
X X
z=1
xz ∗ ˜ Um

P,ωzb(tb
1,m),ωzb(tb
2,m),ωzs(ts
1,m),ωzs(ts
2,m)

(10)
where ωzb(tb
1,m), ωzb(tb
2,m), ωzs(ts
1,m) and ωzs(ts
2,m) denote the z-th NEQ
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4 Equilibrium Analysis of Market Fees
Given the equations to calculate the marketplaces’ expected proﬁts, we now
deﬁne a Nash equilibrium for the marketplaces. Since the strategies of each
marketplace consist of the range of possible fees, an equilibrium constitutes a fee
system P. Speciﬁcally, the Nash equilibrium fee system in our setting is deﬁned
as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 The fees system P∗ = hP∗
m,P∗
−mi constitutes a Nash equilibrium
fee system, if ∀m ∈ M,∀Pm ∈ Ψ,
˜ Um(P∗) =
X
∗
X
z=1
x∗
z ∗ ˜ Um

hP∗
m,P∗
−mi,ωzb∗(tb
1,m),ωzb∗(tb
2,m),ωzs∗(ts
1,m),ωzs∗(ts
2,m)

≥ ˜ Um(P) =
X X
z=1
xz ∗ ˜ Um

hPm,P∗
−mi,ωzb(tb
1,m),ωzb(tb
2,m),ωzs(ts
1,m),ωzs(ts
2,m)

where Ψ is the set of all possible fees.
We now analyse this equilibrium in detail. First, we need to calculate the mar-
ketplaces’ expected proﬁts given diﬀerent fee systems. As we know, the range of
possible fees is continuous, which results in inﬁnitely many possible fee systems.
In [7], researchers claim that for this kind of game, it is useful to approximate the
game by restricting the strategy space, and results from the restricted strategy
space still provide insights into the original game. Similarly in this paper, in or-
der to obtain tractable results, we also restrict the fee space by discretizing these
fees. For example, we discretize proﬁt and registration fees from 0 to 1 with step
size 0.1. Then we can calculate marketplaces’ expected proﬁts corresponding to
these fees, and generate an expected proﬁt matrix for marketplaces, by which
we can analyse the equilibrium fee system.
We now analyse this issues in two cases. Speciﬁcally, in the ﬁrst case, we
consider two competing marketplaces that only charge the proﬁt fees. In the
second case, we consider a setting where one marketplace charges the registration
fee, and the other marketplace charges the proﬁt fee.
4.1 Both Marketplaces Charging Proﬁt Fees
First we consider the case that only proﬁt fees can be charged to traders. We
assume that there are 5 buyers and 5 sellers, and the surpluses of buyers and
sellers are symmetric. Speciﬁcally, we let tb
1 = 4, tb
2 = 6, ts
1 = 0 and ts
2 = 2.
Furthermore, we assume that competing marketplaces charge the same proﬁt
fee to buyers and sellers (i.e. qb
m = qs
m)4. Now we discretize proﬁt fee from 0 to 1
4 At this moment, rich(poor) buyer and rich(poor) seller have the same behaviour of selecting
marketplaces. Then Equations 6 and 9 are consistent and Equations 7 and 8 are consistent. By so
doing, we reduce 4-population replicator dynamics to 2-population replicator dynamics. This is
convenient for visualising how traders evolve their strategies and approximating the size of basins
of attraction in a 2-dimensional space.10 B. Shi, E. H. Gerding, P. Vytelingum and N. R. Jennings
NEQ 2
NEQ 1
Fig.1. Evolutionary process when both marketplaces 1 and 2 charge proﬁt fees. The dotted line
denotes the boundary between the basins of attractions.
(a) Size of basin of attraction to NEQ 1. (b) Size of basin of attraction to NEQ 2.
Fig.2. Sizes of basins of attraction with respect to diﬀerent fees.
with step size 0.1. Therefore each marketplace can choose from 11 diﬀerent proﬁt
fees. For two competing marketplaces, there are 112 = 121 diﬀerent fee systems.
For each of these combinations, we use EGT to obtain the basin of attraction
to each NEQ of market selection strategies. Then by approximating the size of
each basin, we get the probability of traders choosing each NEQ. For example,
when marketplace 1 charges 20% proﬁt fee and marketplace 2 charges 30% proﬁt
fee, the basins of attraction are shown in Fig. 15. From this ﬁgure, we ﬁnd that
all traders will converge to marketplace 1 (NEQ 1) or marketplace 2 (NEQ 2).
By approximating the size of each basin of attraction, we can determine the
probability of traders converging to each NEQ (the probabilities to NEQ 1 and
NEQ 2 are 0.658 and 0.342 respectively in this case).
Now we explore traders’ evolutionary process in all fee systems. The proba-
bility of traders choosing each NEQ of market selection strategies corresponding
to all fee systems are shown in Fig. 2. Then using Equation 10, we calculate the
marketplaces’ expected proﬁts. The results are shown in Table 1. From this table,
5 Here we discretize the mixed strategy of each type of trader from 0.01 to 0.99 with a bigger step
size, 0.098, for clearly visualising purpose.Setting Fees in Competing Double Auction Marketplaces 11
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.0 0.00,0.00 0.00,0.75 0.00,1.02 0.00,0.97 0.00,0.78 0.00,0.58 0.00,0.42 0.00,0.29 0.00,0.22 0.00,0.20 0.00,0.00
0.1 0.75,0.00 1.00,1.00 1.28,1.44 1.54,1.39 1.73,1.10 1.85,0.77 1.91,0.52 1.95,0.34 1.97,0.24 1.98,0.20 2.00,0.00
0.2 1.02,0.00 1.44,1.28 2.00,2.00 2.63,2.05 3.18,1.64 3.56,1.11 3.77,0.70 3.88,0.43 3.93,0.27 3.95,0.22 4.00,0.00
0.3 0.97,0.00 1.39,1.54 2.05,2.63 3.00,3.00 4.07,2.58 4.97,1.72 5.50,1.01 5.76,0.56 5.88,0.32 5.93,0.22 6.00,0.00
0.4 0.78,0.00 1.10,1.73 1.64,3.18 2.58,4.07 4.00,4.00 5.66,2.93 6.90,1.64 7.54,0.81 7.81,0.38 7.90,0.22 8.00,0.00
0.5 0.58,0.00 0.77,1.85 1.11,3.56 1.72,4.97 2.93,5.66 5.00,5.00 7.45,3.06 9.03,1.36 9.65,0.56 9.86,0.25 10.00,0.00
0.6 0.42,0.00 0.52,1.91 0.70,3.77 1.01,5.50 1.64,6.90 3.06,7.45 6.00,6.00 9.54,2.87 11.30,0.93 11.80,0.31 12.00,0.00
0.7 0.29,0.00 0.34,1.95 0.43,3.88 0.56,5.76 0.81,7.54 1.36,9.03 2.87,9.54 7.00,7.00 12.08,2.19 13.66,0.43 14.00,0.00
0.8 0.22,0.00 0.24,1.97 0.27,3.93 0.32,5.88 0.38,7.81 0.56,9.65 0.93,11.30 2.19,12.08 8.00,8.00 15.07,1.04 16.00,0.00
0.9 0.20,0.00 0.20,1.98 0.22,3.95 0.22,5.93 0.22,7.90 0.25,9.86 0.31,11.80 0.43,13.66 1.04,15.07 9.00,9.00 18.00,0.00
1.0 0.00,0.00 0.00,2.00 0.00,4.00 0.00,6.00 0.00,8.00 0.00,10.0 0.00,12.00 0.00,14.00 0.00,16.00 0.00,18.00 10.00,10.00
Table 1. Proﬁts of marketplace 1 and marketplace 2. The ﬁrst column is the proﬁt fee of mar-
ketplace 1 and the ﬁrst row is the proﬁt fee of marketplace 2. The ﬁrst element in each cell is
marketplace 1’s expected proﬁt, and the second is marketplace 2’s expected proﬁt. Bold italic fees
constitute a NEQ fee system.
by using Gambit6, we ﬁnd that both marketplaces charging 30% proﬁt fee con-
stitutes a unique pure NEQ fee system. Interestingly, in this equilibrium, both
competing marketplaces charge non-zero proﬁt fees and therefore make positive
proﬁts. This contrasts with competition between one-sided marketplaces (such
as the classical Bertrand competition), in which competing marketplaces reduce
their fees to their cost level and make zero proﬁt in equilibrium [9]. This is
because, in two-sided double auction marketplaces, there is still a probability
that the traders converge to the marketplace which charges slightly higher fees
compared to its opponent (as can be seen in Fig. 2).
Finally, we also analyse the case when both competing marketplaces charge
registration fees. In this case, the traders’ expected proﬁts on both marketplaces
may be negative, and then traders will not enter any marketplaces. However,
other conclusions are similar to the case that both competing marketplaces
charge proﬁt fees. In particularly, we still ﬁnd traders eventually converge to
one marketplace. The same result holds if we change traders’ types and the
number of traders.
4.2 Asymmetric Market Fees
In this section, we will consider the case that diﬀerent competing marketplaces
charge diﬀerent types of fees: marketplace 1 charges the proﬁt fee, and market-
place 2 charges the registration fee. In previous section, we ﬁnd that traders
always converge to one of two equilibria when they are limited to charging the
same type of fees. This means that marketplaces cannot co-exist when traders
are in equilibrium. In this section, we ﬁrst analyse whether competing market-
places can co-exist when diﬀerent types of fees are allowed. Then we analyse the
equilibrium fee system.
We still assume that competing marketplaces charge the same fee to buyers
and sellers (i.e. pb
m = ps
m and qb
m = qs
m). Then we discretize registration and
proﬁt fees from 0 to 1 with step size 0.1. Then there are again 121 diﬀerent
fee systems. By evolving traders’ strategies from diﬀerent starting points and
under diﬀerent fee systems, we ﬁnd co-existence of competing marketplaces.
For example, when marketplace 1 charges 50% proﬁt fee and marketplace 2
6 http://gambit.sourceforge.net/12 B. Shi, E. H. Gerding, P. Vytelingum and N. R. Jennings
NEQ 2
NEQ 1 NEQ 3
Fig.3. Evolutionary process when marketplace 1 charges proﬁt fee and marketplace 2 charges
registration fee. The dotted line denotes the boundary between the basins of attractions.
(a) Size of basin of attraction to NEQ 1. (b) Size of basin of attraction to NEQ 2.
(c) Size of basin of attraction to NEQ 3.
Fig.4. Sizes of basins of attraction with respect to diﬀerent fees.
charges 0.8 registration fee, the evolution of traders’ selection strategies from
diﬀerent starting points is shown in Fig. 3. From this ﬁgure, we ﬁnd that there
are now three basins of attraction: all traders converge to marketplace 1 (NEQ
1); all traders converge to marketplace 2 (NEQ 2); rich traders converge to
marketplace 2, and poor traders converge to marketplace 1 (NEQ 3), i.e. two
competing marketplaces co-exist in equilibrium. By exploring traders’ marketSetting Fees in Competing Double Auction Marketplaces 13
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.0 0.00,0.00 0.00,0.43 0.00,0.73 0.00,0.90 0.00,0.86 0.00,0.77 0.00,0.67 0.00,0.54 0.00,0.43 0.00,0.31 0.00,0.23
0.1 0.75,0.00 0.89,0.56 1.03,0.97 1.18,1.22 1.32,1.32 1.49,1.20 1.69,0.92 1.79,0.73 1.86,0.54 1.91,0.39 1.95,0.27
0.2 1.02,0.00 1.31,0.67 1.55,1.22 1.84,1.62 2.15,1.85 2.48,1.81 2.83,1.59 3.22,1.22 3.62,0.75 3.76,0.54 3.86,0.36
0.3 1.00,0.00 1.29,0.79 1.59,1.47 1.97,2.01 2.37,2.42 2.88,2.55 3.44,2.33 4.00,1.99 4.49,1.64 5.20,1.01 5.67,0.53
0.4 0.80,0.00 1.03,0.87 1.34,1.66 1.72,2.36 2.19,2.90 2.66,3.34 3.35,3.30 4.17,2.89 4.91,2.48 5.62,2.03 6.32,1.53
0.5 0.57,0.00 0.79,0.92 1.07,1.79 1.36,2.59 1.77,3.29 2.20,3.90 2.72,4.37 3.71,3.99 4.62,3.49 5.56,2.99 6.38,2.56
0.6 0.38,0.00 0.54,0.96 0.76,1.87 0.92,2.77 1.28,3.57 1.66,4.31 2.12,4.94 2.64,5.44 3.92,4.64 4.99,4.03 5.97,3.54
0.7 0.22,0.00 0.32,0.98 0.48,1.93 0.70,2.85 0.85,3.76 1.15,4.59 1.53,5.35 1.93,6.03 2.73,6.14 4.09,5.18 5.19,4.55
0.8 0.11,0.00 0.18,0.99 0.29,1.96 0.37,2.93 0.54,3.86 0.77,4.76 1.01,5.62 1.26,6.45 1.71,7.14 2.86,6.66 4.35,5.54
0.9 0.04,0.00 0.09,1.00 0.16,1.98 0.20,2.97 0.29,3.94 0.45,4.88 0.61,5.80 0.81,6.69 1.10,7.51 1.48,8.26 3.24,6.92
1.0 0.00,0.00 0.00,1.00 0.04,2.00 0.10,2.99 0.14,3.97 0.22,4.95 0.36,5.89 0.50,6.83 0.68,7.73 0.90,8.60 1.18,9.41
Table 2. Proﬁts of marketplace 1 and marketplace 2. The ﬁrst column is the proﬁt fee of market-
place 1 and the ﬁrst row is the registration fee of marketplace 2. The ﬁrst element in each cell is
marketplace 1’s expected proﬁt, and the second is marketplace 2’s expected proﬁt. Bold italic fees
constitute a NEQ fee system.
Fig.5. Size of basins of attraction with respect to changed registration fees.
selection strategies under all possible fee systems, we obtain the probabilities of
traders converging to each NEQ, which are shown in Fig. 4. Fig. 4(c) shows in
which fee systems, traders may converge to diﬀerent marketplaces.
After estimating the probabilities of traders’ convergence to each NEQ, we
then calculate the marketplaces’ expected proﬁts using Equation 10. The mar-
ketplaces’ expected proﬁts are shown in Table 2, from which we can see that in
this case, marketplace 1 charging 30% proﬁt fee, and marketplace 2 charging 0.5
registration fee constitutes the unique NEQ fee system.
Now we analyse how registration and proﬁt fees aﬀect the market selections
of traders with diﬀerent types. We note that, since the surplus of transaction
between rich traders is higher than that between poor traders, then for the
same proﬁt fee, rich traders will lose more absolute proﬁts than poor traders.
Speciﬁcally, we let marketplace 1 charge 60% proﬁt fee, marketplace 2 charge
registration fee from 0 to 3 with step size 0.1. The sizes of basins of attraction
with respect to the registration fee are shown in Fig. 5. From the ﬁgure, we can
see that when the registration fee is low, traders prefer to choose marketplace
2. This is shown by the line with triangle, which is above two other lines in the
beginning. Then as the registration fee increases, poor traders will choose to leave
marketplace 2 since increased registration fee cause decreased and even negative14 B. Shi, E. H. Gerding, P. Vytelingum and N. R. Jennings
proﬁts for them. Rich traders may still prefer marketplace 2 since compared to
marketplace 1 which extracts more absolute proﬁts by charging the proﬁt fee,
marketplace 2 is still cheaper. This is shown by the increased lines with circle
and square when the registration fee increases from 0 to about 1. However, when
the registration fee becomes very high, both rich and poor traders will leave since
their proﬁts will be negative if they still choose to stay. This is shown by the
decreased lines with triangle and circle and the increased line with square when
the registration fee increases from 1 to 3.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we provided an approach to estimate marketplaces’ expected prof-
its for a given fee system, based on the equilibrium of the traders’ market se-
lection strategies, and the likelihood of various equilibria occurring. We then
analysed the NEQ fee system in two diﬀerent cases: where marketplaces charge
the same type of fees and where they charge diﬀerent types of fees. Such anal-
ysis is useful to guide the charging behaviour of competing marketplaces. For
the settings analysed in this paper, we found that a pure Nash equilibrium
always exists in which both competing marketplaces charge non-zero fees. In
addition, we found that when one marketplace charges the registration fee and
the other charges the proﬁt fee, two competing marketplace may co-exist in
which the traders are in equilibrium. In this equilibrium, rich traders converge
to the marketplace charging the registration fee, and poor traders converge to
the marketplace charging the proﬁt fee.
In this analysis, we have assumed that traders use the truthtelling bidding
strategy, which results in traders’ true proﬁts being revealed to the marketplaces.
However, when traders adopt a bidding strategy that can shade their true types,
traders can keep more proﬁts even when the proﬁt fee is high. In the future,
we intend to analyse the equilibrium fee system in this case. Moreover, in prac-
tice, traders may never converge to any NEQ market selection strategies since
competing marketplaces may keep adapting their fees. In this dynamic process,
we want to address how competing marketplaces dynamically change their fees
corresponding to the opponents’ fees and traders’ current market selections. Fur-
thermore, we also would like to generalise our analysis of the traders’ equilibrium
behaviour of market selection strategies as well as the bidding strategies by con-
sidering traders with continuous types, and then analyse how to ﬁnd a NEQ fee
system for competing marketplaces.
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